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Abstract
The introduction of remote attestation (RA) schemes has al-
lowed academia and industry to enhance the security of their
systems. The commercial products currently available enable
only the validation of static properties, such as applications fin-
gerprint, and do not handle runtime properties, such as control-
flow correctness. This limitation pushed researchers towards
the identification of new approaches, called runtime RA. How-
ever, those mainly work on embedded devices, which share
very few common features with complex systems, such as
virtual machines in a cloud. A naive deployment of runtime
RA schemes for embedded devices on complex systems faces
scalability problems, such as the representation of complex
control-flows or slow verification phase.
In this work, we present ScaRR: the first Scalable Runtime
Remote attestation schema for complex systems. Thanks to
its novel control-flow model, ScaRR enables the deployment
of runtime RA on any application regardless of its complexity,
by also achieving good performance. We implemented ScaRR
and tested it on the benchmark suite SPEC CPU 2017. We
show that ScaRR can validate on average 2M control-flow
events per second, definitely outperforming existing solutions
that support runtime RA on complex systems.
1 Introduction
RA is a procedure that allows an entity (i.e., the Verifier) to
verify the status of a device (i.e., the Prover) from a remote
location. This is achieved by having first the Verifier sending
a challenge to the Prover, which replies with a report. Then,
the Verifier analyzes the report to identify whether the Prover
has been compromised [10]. In standard RA, usually defined
as static, the Prover verification involves the integrity of spe-
cific hardware and software properties (e.g., the Prover has
loaded the correct software). On the market, there are already
several available products implementing static RA, such as
Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [18] or Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) [41]. However, these do not provide a defence
against runtime attacks (e.g., the control-flow ones) that aim to
modify the program runtime behaviour. Therefore, to identify
Prover runtime modifications, researchers proposed runtime
RA. Among the different solutions belonging to this category,
there are also the control-flow attestation approaches, which
encode the information about the executed control-flow of a
process [8, 9].
In comparison to static RA, the runtime one is relatively
new, and today there are no reliable products available on the
market since researchers have mainly investigated runtime RA
for embedded devices [8, 9, 21, 22, 49]: most of them encode
the complete execution path of a Prover in a single hash [8,22,
49]; some [9] compress it in a simpler representation and rely
on a policy-based verification schema; other ones [21] adopt
symbolic execution to verify the control-flow information
continuously sent by the Prover. Even if they have different
performances, none of the previous solutions can be applied
to a complex system (e.g., virtual machines in a cloud) due to
the following reasons: (i) representing all the valid execution
paths through hash values is unfeasible (e.g., the number of
execution paths tends to grow exponentially with the size
of the program), (ii) the policy-based approaches might not
cover all the possible attacks, (iii) symbolic execution slows
down the verification phase.
The purpose of our work is to fill this gap by providing
ScaRR, the first runtime RA schema for complex systems.
In particular, we focus on environments such as Amazon
Web Services [2] or Microsoft Azure [3]. Since we target
such systems, we require support for features such as multi-
threading. Thus, ScaRR provides the following achievements
with respect over the current solutions supporting runtime
RA: (i) it makes the runtime RA feasible for any software,
(ii) it enables the Verifier to verify intermediate states of the
Prover without interrupting its execution (iii) it supports a
more fine-grained analysis of the execution path where the
attack has been performed. We achieve these goals thanks to a
novel model for representing the execution paths of a program,
which is based on the fragmentation of the whole path into
meaningful sub-paths. As a consequence, the Prover can send
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a series of intermediate partial reports, which are immediately
validated by the Verifier thanks to the lightweight verification
procedures performed.
ScaRR is designed to defend a Prover, equipped with
a trusted anchor and with a set of the standard solutions
(e.g., W⊕X/DEP [33], Address Space Layout Randomiza-
tion (ASLR) [28] and Stack Canaries [14]), from attacks per-
formed in the user-space and aimed at modifying the Prover
runtime behaviour. The current implementation of ScaRR
requires the program source code to be properly instrumented
through a compiler based on LLVM [30]. However, it is pos-
sible to use lifting techniques [5], as well. Once deployed,
ScaRR allows to verify on average 2M control-flow events
per second, which is significantly more than the few hundred
per second [21] or the thousands per second [9] verifiable
through the existing solutions.
Contribution. The contributions of this work are the fol-
lowing ones:
• We designed a new model for representing the execution
path for applications of any complexity.
• We designed and developed ScaRR, the first schema that
supports runtime RA for complex systems.
• We evaluated the ScaRR performances in terms of: (i) at-
testation speed (i.e., the time required by the Prover
to generate a partial report), (ii) verification speed (i.e.,
the time required by the Verifier to evaluate a partial
report), (iii) overall generated network traffic (i.e., the
network traffic generated during the communication be-
tween Prover and Verifier).
Organization. The paper is organized as follow. First, we
provide a background on standard RA and control-flow ex-
ploitation (Section 2), and define the threat model (Section 3).
Then, we describe the ScaRR control-flow model (Section 4)
and its design (Section 5). We discuss ScaRR implementation
details (Section 6) and evaluate its performance and security
guarantees (Section 7). Finally, we discuss ScaRR limitations
(Section 8), related works (Section 9), and conclude with final
remarks (Section 10).
2 Background
The purpose of this section is to provide background knowl-
edge about standard RA procedures and control-flow attacks.
Remote Attestation. RA always involves a Prover and a
Verifier, with the latter responsible for verifying the current
status of the former. Usually, the Verifier sends a challenge to
the Prover asking to measure specific properties. The Prover,
then, calculates the required measurement (e.g., a hash of
the application loaded) and sends back a report R, which
contains the measurement M along with a digital fingerprint
F, for instance, R = (M,F). Finally, the Verifier evaluates the
report, considering its freshness (i.e., the report has not been
generated through a replay attack) and correctness (i.e., the
Prover measurement is valid). It is a standard assumption that
the Verifier is trusted, while the Prover might be compromised.
However, the Prover is able to generate a correct and fresh
report due to its trusted anchor (e.g., a dedicated hardware
module).
Control-Flow Attacks. To introduce control-flow attacks,
we first discuss the concepts of control-flow graph (CFG),
execution-path, and basic-block (BBL) by using the simple
program shown in Figure 1a as a reference example. The
program starts with the acquisition of an input from the user
(line 1). This is evaluated (line 2) in order to redirect the
execution towards the retrieval of a privileged information
(line 3) or an unprivileged one (line 4). Then, the retrieved
information is stored in a variable (y), which is returned as
an output (line 5), before the program properly concludes its
execution (line 6).
A CFG represents all the paths that a program may traverse
during its execution and it is statically computed. On the con-
trary, an execution path is a single path of the CFG traversed
by the program at runtime. The CFG associated to the pro-
gram in Figure 1a is depicted in Figure 1b and it encompasses
two components: nodes and edges. The former are the BBLs
of the program, while the latter represent the standard flow
traversed by the program to move from a BBL towards the
next one. A BBL is a linear sequence of instructions with a
single entry point (i.e., no incoming branches to the set of
instructions other than the first), and a single exit point (i.e.,
no outgoing branches from the set of instructions other than
the last). Therefore, a BBL can be considered an atomic unit
with respect to the control-flow, as it will either be fully exe-
cuted, or not executed at all on a given execution path. A BBL
might end with a control-flow event, which could be one of
N1
N2
N3
N4
N5
N6
x = input()
if x == ‘auth’:
y = get_privileged_info()
else:
y = get_unprivileged_info()
output(y)
terminate
= return address corruption
(a) Pseudo-code of a program under
a control-flow attack.
N1
N2
N3
N5
N4
N6
a
(b) Control-flow graph of
a program under a control-
flow attack.
Figure 1: Illustrative example of a control-flow attack.
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the following in a X86_64 architecture: procedure calls (e.g.,
call), jumps (e.g., jmp), procedure returns (e.g., ret), and
system calls (e.g., syscall). During its execution, a process
traverses several BBLs, which completely define the process
execution path.
Runtime attacks, and more specifically the control-flow
ones, aim at modifying the CFG of a program by tampering
with its execution path. Considering Figure 1, we assume that
an attacker is able to run the program (from the node N1), but
that he is not authorized to retrieve the privileged information.
However, the attacker can, anyway, violate those controls
through a memory corruption error performed on the node N4.
As soon as the attacker provides an input to the program and
starts its execution, he will be redirected to the node N4. At
this point, the attacker can exploit a memory corruption error
(e.g., a stack overflow) to introduce a new edge from N4 to
N3 (edge labeled as a) and retrieve the privileged information.
As a result, the program traverses an unexpected execution
path not belonging to its original CFG. Even though several
solutions have been proposed to mitigate such attacks (e.g.,
ASLR [28]), attackers still manage to perform them [42].
This illustrative example about how to manipulate the exe-
cution path of a program is usually the basic step to perform
more sophisticated attacks like exploiting a vulnerability to
take control of a process [48] or installing a persistent data-
only malware without injecting new code, once the control
over a process is taken by the attacker [43].
Runtime RA provide a reliable mechanism which allows
the Verifier to trace and validate the execution path undertaken
by the Prover.
3 Threat Model and Requirements
In this section, we describe the features of the Attacker and
the Prover involved in out threat model. Our assumptions are
in line with other RA schemes [8, 9, 18, 21, 46].
Attacker. We assume to have an attacker that aims to con-
trol a remote service, such as a Web Server or a DBMS, and
that has already bypassed the default protections, such as Con-
trol Flow Integrity (CFI). To achieve his aim, the attacker can
adopt different techniques, among which: Return-Oriented
Programming (ROP)/ Jump-Oriented Programming (JOP) at-
tacks [16, 17], function hooks [34], injection of a malware
into the victim process, installation of a data-only malware
in user-space [43], or manipulation of other user-space pro-
cesses, such as security monitors. In our threat model, we
do not consider physical attacks (our complex systems are
supposed to be virtual machines), pure data-oriented attacks
(e.g., attacks that do not alter the original program CFG), self-
modifying code, and dynamic loading of code at runtime (e.g.,
just-in-time compilers [40]).
Prover. The Prover is assumed to be equipped with: (i) a
trusted anchor that guarantees a static RA, (ii) standard de-
fence mitigation techniques, such as W⊕X/DEP, ASLR. In
our implementation, we use the kernel as a trusted anchor,
which is a reasonable assumption if the machines have trusted
modules such as a TPM [41]. However, we can also use a
dedicated hardware, as discussed in Section 8. The Prover
maintains sensitive information (i.e., shared keys and crypto-
graphic functions) in the trusted anchor and uses it to generate
fresh reports, that cannot be tampered by the attacker.
4 ScaRR Control-Flow Model
ScaRR is the first schema that allows to apply runtime RA
on complex systems. To achieve this goal, it relies on a new
model for representing the CFG/execution path of a program.
In this section, we illustrate first the main components of our
control-flow model (Section 4.1) and, then, the challenges we
faced during its design (Section 4.2).
4.1 Basic Concepts
The ScaRR control-flow model handles BBLs at assembly
level and involves two components: checkpoints and List of
Actions (LoA).
A checkpoint is a special BBL used as a delimiter for iden-
tifying the start or the end of a sub-path within the CGF/ex-
ecution path of a program. A checkpoint can be: thread be-
ginning/end, if it identifies the beginning/end of a thread;
exit-point, if it represents an exit-point from an application
module (e.g., a system call or a library function invocation);
virtual-checkpoint, if it is used for managing special cases
such as loops and recursions.
A LoA is the series of significant edges that a process tra-
verses to move from a checkpoint to the next one. Each edge
is represented through its source and destination BBL and,
comprehensively, a LoA is defined through the following no-
tation:
[(BBLs1,BBLd1), . . . ,(BBLsn,BBLdn)].
Among all the edges involved in the complete representation
of a CFG, we consider only a subset of them. In particular, we
look only at those edges that identify a unique execution path:
procedure call, procedure return and branch (i.e., conditional
and indirect jumps).
To better illustrate the ScaRR control-flow model, we now
recall the example introduced in Section 2. Among the six
nodes belonging to the CFG of the example, only the fol-
lowing four ones are checkpoints: N1, since it is a thread
beginning; N3 and N4, because they are exit-points, and N6,
since it is a thread end. In addition, the LoAs associated to the
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example are the following ones:
N1−N3⇒ [(N2,N3)]
N1−N4⇒ [(N2,N4)]
N3−N6⇒ []
N4−N6⇒ [].
On the left we indicate a pair of checkpoints (e.g., N1−N3),
while on the right the associated LoA (empty LoAs are con-
sidered valid).
4.2 Challenges
Loops, recursions, signals, and exceptions involved in the
execution of a program introduce new challenges in the rep-
resentation of a CFG since they can generate uncountable
executions paths. For example, loops and recursions can gen-
erate an indefinite number of possible combinations of LoA,
while signals, as well as exceptions, can introduce an unpre-
dictable execution path at any time.
Loops. In Figure 2, we illustrate the approach used to han-
dle loops. Since it is not always possible to count the number
of iterations of a loop, we consider the conditional node of the
loop (N1) as a virtual-checkpoint. Thus, the LoAs associated
to the example shown in Figure 2 are as follows:
SA−N1⇒ []
N1−N1⇒ [(N1,N2)]
N1−SB⇒ [(N1,N3)].
Recursions. In Figure 3, we illustrate our approach to han-
dle recursions, i.e., a function that invokes itself. Intuitively,
the LoAs connecting PB and PE should contain all the possible
invocations made by a() towards itself, but the number of
invocations is indefinite. Thus, we consider the node perform-
ing the recursion as a virtual-checkpoint and model only the
path that could be chosen, without referring to the number
of times it is really undertaken. The resulting LoAs for the
SA
N1
SBN2
N3
virtual -checkpoint
Figure 2: Loop example in the ScaRR control-flow model.
PB
virtual -checkpoint
a()
N3N1
N2
PE
call ret
call
ret
Figure 3: Recursion example in the ScaRR control-flow
model.
example in Figuree 3 as the following ones:
PB−N2⇒ [(PB,N1),(N1,N2)]
N2−N2⇒ [(N2,N1),(N1,N2)]
N2−N2⇒ [(N2,N1),(N1,N3),(N3,N2)]
N2−PE ⇒ [(N2,N1),(N1,N3),(N3,PE)]
PB−PE ⇒ [(PB,N1),(N1,N3),(N3,PE)].
Finally, the virtual-checkpoint can be used as a general
approach to solve every situation in which an indirect jump
targets a node already present in the LoA.
Signals. When a thread receives a signal, its execution is
stopped and, after a context-switch, it is diverted to a ded-
icated handler (e.g., a function). This scenario makes the
control-flow unpredictable, since an interruption can occur at
any point during the execution. To manage this case, ScaRR
models the signal handler as a separate thread (adding begin-
ning/end thread checkpoints) and computes the relative LoAs.
If no handler is available for the signal that interrupted the
program, the entire process ends immediately, producing a
wrong LoA.
Exception Handler. Similar to signals, when a thread rises
an exception, the execution path is stopped and control is trans-
ferred to a catch block. Since ScaRR has been implemented
for Linux, we model the catch blocks as a separate thread
(adding beginning/end thread checkpoints), but it is also pos-
sible to adapt ScaRR to fulfill different exception handling
mechanisms (e.g., in Windows). In case no catch block is
suitable for the exception that was thrown, the process gets
interrupted and the generated LoA is wrong.
5 System Design
To apply runtime RA on a complex system, there are two fun-
damental requirements: (i) handling the representation of a
complex CFG or execution path, (ii) having a fast verification
process. Previous works have tried to achieve the first require-
ment through different approaches. A first solution [8, 22, 49]
is based on the association of all the valid execution paths of
the Prover with a single hash value. Intuitively, this is not a
scalable approach because it does not allow to handle complex
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CFG/execution paths. On the contrary, a second approach [21]
relies on the transmission of all the control-flow events to the
Verifier, which then applies a symbolic execution to validate
their correctness. While addressing the first requirement, this
solution suffers from a slow verification phase, which leads
toward a failure in satisfying the second requirement.
Thanks to its novel control-flow model, ScaRR enables
runtime RA for complex systems, since its design specifically
considers the above-mentioned requirements with the purpose
of addressing both of them. In this section, we provide an
overview of the ScaRR schema (Section 5.1) together with the
details of its workflow (Section 5.2), explicitly motivating how
we address both the requirements needed to apply runtime
RA on complex systems.
5.1 Overview
Even if the ScaRR control-flow model is composed of check-
points and LoAs, the ScaRR schema relies on a different
type of elements, which are the measurements. Those are a
combination of checkpoints and LoAs and contain the neces-
sary information to perform runtime RA. Figure 4 shows an
overview of ScaRR, which encompasses the following four
components: a Measurements Generator, for identifying all
the program valid measurements; a Measurements DB, for
saving all the program valid measurements; a Prover, which is
the machine running the monitored program; a Verifier, which
is the machine performing the program runtime verification.
As a whole, the workflow of ScaRR involves two separate
phases: an Offline Program Analysis and an Online Program
Verification. During the first phase, the Measurements Gener-
ator calculates the CFG of the monitored Application A (Step
1 in Figure 4) and, after generating all the Application A valid
measurements, it saves them in the Measurements DB (Step
2 in Figure 4). During the second phase, the Verifier sends a
challenge to the Prover (Step 3 in Figure 4). Thus, the Prover
starts executing the Application A and sending partial reports
to the Verifier (Step 4 in Figure 4). The Verifier validates the
freshness and correctness of the partial reports by comparing
the received new measurements with the previous ones stored
in the Measurements DB. Finally, as soon as the Prover fin-
ishes the processing of the input received from the Verifier, it
sends back the associated output.
5.2 Details
As shown in Figure 4, the workflow of ScaRR goes through
five different steps. Here, we provide details for each of those.
(1) Application CFG. The Measurements Generator exe-
cutes the Application A(), or a subset of it (e.g., a function),
and extracts the associated CFG G.
(2) Offline Measurements. After generating the CFG, the
Measurements Generator computes all the program offline
measurements during the Offline Program Analysis. Each
offline measurement is represented as a key-value pair as
follows:
(cpA,cpB,H(LoA))⇒ [(BBLs1,BBLd1), . . . ,(BBLsn,BBLdn)]
The key refers to a triplet, which contains two checkpoints
(i.e., cpA and cpB) and the hash of the LoA (i.e., H(LoA))
associated to the significant BBLs that are traversed when
moving from the source checkpoint to the destination one.
The value refers only to a subset of the BBLs pairs used
to generate the hash of the LoAs and, in particular, only to
procedure calls and procedure returns. Those are the control-
flow events required to mount the shadow stack during the
verification phase.
(3) Request for a Challenge. The Verifier starts a chal-
lenge with the Prover by sending it an input and a nonce,
which prevents replay attacks.
(4) Online Measurements. While the Application A pro-
cesses the input received from the Verifier, the Prover starts
generating the online measurements which keep trace of the
Application A executed paths. Each online measurement is
represented through the same notation used for the keys in
the offline measurements, i.e., the triplet (cpA,cpB,H(LoA)).
When the number of online measurements reaches a pre-
configured limit, the Prover encloses all of them in a partial
report and sends it to the Verifier. The partial report is defined
as follows:
Pi = (R,FK(R||N||i))
R = (T,M).
In the current notation, Pi is the i-th partial report, R the pay-
load and FK(R||N||i) the digital fingerprint (e.g., a message
authentication code [15]). This is generated by using: (i) the
secret key K, shared between Prover and Verifier, (ii) the
nonce N, sent at the beginning of the protocol, and (iii) the
index i, which is a counter of the number of partial reports.
Finally, the payload R contains the online measurements M
along with the associated thread T .
The novel communication paradigm between Prover and
Verifier, based on the transmission and consequent verifica-
tion of several partial reports, satisfies the first requirement
for applying runtime RA on complex systems (i.e., handling
the representation of a complex CFG/execution path). This
is achieved thanks to the ScaRR control-flow model, which
allows to fragment the whole CFG/execution path into sub-
paths. Consequently, the Prover can send intermediate reports
even before the Application A finishes to process the received
input. In addition, the fragmentation of the whole execution
path into sub-paths allows to have a more fine-grained anal-
ysis of the program runtime behaviour since it is possible
to identify the specific edge on which the attack has been
performed.
(5) Report Verification. In runtime RA, the Verifier has
two different purposes: verifying whether the running appli-
cation is still the original one and whether the execution paths
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Figure 4: ScaRR system overview.
traversed by it are the expected ones. The first purpose, which
we assume to be already implemented in the system [18, 46],
can be achieved through a static RA applied on the Prover
software stack. On the contrary, the second purpose is the
main focus in our design of the ScaRR schema.
As soon as the Verifier receives a partial report Pi, it first
performs a formal integrity check by considering its finger-
print FK(R||N||i). Then, it considers the online measurements
sent within the report and performs the following checks:
(C1) whether the online measurements are the expected ones
(i.e., it compares the received online measurements with the
offline ones stored in the Measurements DB), (C2) whether
the destination checkpoint of each measurement is equal to
the source checkpoint of the following one, and (C3) whether
the LoAs are coherent with the stack status by mounting a
shadow stack. If one of the previous checks fails, the Verifier
notifies an anomaly and it will reject the output generated by
the Prover.
All the above-mentioned checks performed by the Veri-
fier are lightweight procedures (i.e., a lookup in a hash map
data structure and a shadow stack update). The speed of the
second verification mechanism depends on the number of
procedure calls and procedure returns found for each mea-
surement. Thus, also the second requirement for applying
runtime RA on complex systems is satisfied (i.e., keeping a
fast verification phase). Once again, this is a consequence of
the ScaRR control-flow model since the fragmentation of the
execution paths allows both Prover and Verifier to work on
a small amount of data. Moreover, since the Verifier imme-
diately validates a report as soon as it receives a new one, it
can also detect an attack even before the Application A has
completed the processing of the input.
5.3 Shadow Stack
To improve the defences provided by ScaRR, we introduce
a shadow stack mechanism on the Verifier side. To illustrate
S
M1
M2
M3
M4
E
A1
C
A2
int main(int argc, char ** argv) {
  a(10);
  /* irrelevant code */
  a(6);
  return 0;
}
void a(int x) {
  /* irrelevant code */
  printf("%d\n", x);
  return;
}
Figure 5: Illustrative example to explain the shadow stack on
the ScaRR Verifier.
it, we refer to the program shown in Figure 5, which contains
only two functions: main() and a(). Each line of the program
is a BBL and, in particular: the first BBL (i.e., S) and the
last BBL (i.e., E) of the main() function are a beginning
thread and end thread checkpoints, respectively; the function
a() contains a function call to printf(), which is an exit-
point. According to the ScaRR control-flow model, the offline
measurements are the following ones:
(S,C,H1)⇒ [(M1,A1)],
(C,C,H2)⇒ [(A2,M2),(M3,A1)],
(C,E,H3)⇒ [(A2,M4)].
The significant BBLs we consider for generating the LoAs
are: (i) the ones connecting the BBL S to the checkpoint C,
(ii) the ones connecting two checkpoints C, and (iii) the ones
to move from the checkpoint C to the last BBL E.
In this scenario, an attacker may hijack the return address
of the function a() in order to jump to the BBL M3. If this
happens, the Prover produces the following online measure-
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(M1,A1)
(M1,A1)
(A2,M2) (M3,A1)
(M3,A1)
(A2,M2)
valid!
(A2,M2) ret_to (M1,A1)
not valid!
(A2,M2) ret_to (M3,A1)
(S,C,H1) (C,C,H2) (C,C,H2)
Time
Figure 6: Implementation of the shadow stack on the ScaRR
Verifier.
ments:
(S,C,H1)→ (C,C,H2)→ (C,C,H2)→ . . . .
Although generated after an attack, those measurements are
still compliant with the checks (C1) and (C2) of the Veri-
fier. Thus, to detect this attack, we introduce a new relation
(i.e., ret_to) to illustrate the link between two edges. The
Measurements Generator computes all the ret_to relations
during the Offline Program Analysis and saves them in the
Measurements DB using the following notation:
(A2,M2) ret_to (M1,A1),
(A2,M4) ret_to (M3,A1).
Figure 6 shows how the Verifier combines all these infor-
mation to build a remote shadow stack. At the beginning, the
shadow stack is empty (i.e., no function has been invoked
yet). Then, according to the online measurement (S,C,H1),
the Prover has invoked the main() function passing through
the edge (M1,A1), which is pushed on the top of the stack
by the Verifier. Then, the online measurement (C,C,H2) in-
dicates that the execution path exited from the function a()
through the edge (A2,M2), which is in relation with the edge
on the top of the stack and therefore is valid. Moving forward,
the Verifier pops from the stack and pushes the edge (M3,A1),
which corresponds to the second invocation of the function
a(). At this point, the third measurement (C,C,H2) indicates
that the Prover exited from the function a() through the edge
(A2,M2), which is not in relation with (M3,A1). Thus, the
Verifier detects the attack and triggers an alarm.
6 Implementation
Here, we provide the technical details of the ScaRR schema
and, in particular, of the Measurements Generator (Sec-
tion 6.1) and of the Prover (Section 6.2).
6.1 Measurements Generator
The Measurements Generator is implemented as a compiler,
based on LLVM [30] and on the CRAB framework [24].
Despite this approach, it is also possible to use frameworks
to lift the binary code to LLVM intermediate-representation
(IR) [5].
The Measurements Generator requires the program source
code to perform the following operations: (i) generating the
offline measurements, and (ii) detecting and instrumenting
the control-flow events. During the compilation, the Mea-
surements Generator analyzes the LLVM IR to identify the
control-flow events and generate the offline measurements,
while it uses the CRAB LLVM framework to generate the
CFG, since it provides a heap abstract domain that resolves in-
direct forward jumps. Again during the compilation, the Mea-
surements Generator instruments each control-flow event to
invoke a tracing function which is contained in the trusted an-
chor. To map LLVM IR BBLs to assembly BBLs, we remove
the optimization flags and we include dummy code, which
is removed after the compilation through a binary-rewriting
tool. To provide the above-mentioned functionalities, we add
around 3.5K lines of code on top of CRAB and LLVM 5.0.
6.2 Prover
The Prover is responsible for running the monitored appli-
cation, generating the application online measurements and
sending the partial reports to the Verifier. To achieve the sec-
ond aim, the Prover relies on the architecture depicted in
Figure 7, which encompasses several components belonging
either to the user-space (i.e., Application Process and ScaRR
Libraries) or to the kernel-space (i.e., ScaRR sys_addaction,
ScaRR Module, and ScaRR sys_measure).
Each component works as follows:
• Application Process - the process running the monitored
application, which is equipped with the required instru-
mentation for detecting control-flow events at runtime.
• ScaRR Libraries - the libraries added to the original
application to trace control-flow events and checkpoints.
• ScaRR sys_addaction - a custom kernel syscall used to
trace control-flow events.
• ScaRR Module - a module that keeps trace of the online
measurements and of the partial reports. It also extracts
the BBL labels from their runtime addresses, since the
ASLR protection changes the BBLs location at each run.
• ScaRR sys_measure - a custom kernel syscall used to
generate the online measurements.
When the Prover receives a challenge, it starts the execution
of the application and creates a new online measurement. Dur-
ing the execution, the application can encounter checkpoints
or control-flow events, both hooked by the instrumentation.
Every time the application crosses a control-flow event, the
ScaRR Libraries invoke the ScaRR sys_addaction syscall to
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Figure 7: Internal architecture of the Prover.
save the new edge in a buffer inside the kernel-space. While,
every time the application crosses a checkpoint, the ScaRR
Libraries invoke the ScaRR sys_measure syscall to save the
checkpoint in the current online measurement, calculate the
hash of the edges saved so far, and, finally, store the online
measurement in a buffer located in the kernel-space. When
the predefined number of online measurements is reached,
the Prover sends a partial report to the Verifier and starts
collecting new online measurements. The Prover sends the
partial report by using a dedicated kernel thread. The whole
procedure is repeated until the application finishes processing
the input of the Verifier.
The whole architecture of the Prover relies on the kernel
as a trusted anchor, since we find it more efficient in compari-
son to other commercial trusted platforms, such as SGX and
TrustZone, but other approaches can be also considered (Sec-
tion 8). To develop the kernel side of the architecture, we add
around 200 lines of code to a Kernel version v4.17-rc3. We
also include the Blake2 source [4,11], which is faster and pro-
vides high cryptographic security guarantees for calculating
the hash of the LoAs.
7 Evaluation
We evaluate ScaRR from two perspectives. First, we measure
its performance focusing on: attestation speed (Section 7.1),
verification speed (Section 7.2) and network impact (Sec-
tion 7.3). Then, we discuss ScaRR security and privacy guar-
antees (Section 7.4).
We obtained the results described in this section by run-
ning the bench-marking suite SPEC CPU 2017 over a Linux
machine equipped with an Intel i7 processor and 16GB of
memory 1. We instrumented each tool to detect all the neces-
sary control-flow events, we then extracted the offline mea-
surements and we ran each experiment to analyze a specific
performance metrics.
1We did not manage to map assembly BBL addresses to LLVM IR for
519.lbm_r and 520.omnetpp_r.
Figure 8: Average attestation speed measured as number of
online measurements per second.
7.1 Attestation Speed
We measure the attestation speed as the number of online mea-
surements per second generated by the Prover. Figure 8 shows
the average attestation speed and the standard deviation for
each experiment of the SPEC CPU 2017. More specifically,
we run each experiment 10 times, calculate the number of on-
line measurements generated per second in each run, and we
compute the final average and standard deviation. Our results
show that ScaRR has a range of attestation speed which goes
from 250K (510.parest) to over 400K (505.mcf) of online
measurements per second. This variability in performance
depends on the complexity of the single experiment and on
other issues, such as the file loading. Previous works prove
to have an attestation speed around 20K/ 30K of control-flow
events per second [8, 9]. Since each online measurement con-
tains at least a control-flow event, we can claim that ScaRR
has an attestation speed at least 10 times faster than the one
offered by the existing solutions.
7.2 Verification Speed
During the validation of the partial reports, the Verifier per-
forms a lookup against the Measurements DB and an update
of the shadow stack. To evaluate the overall performance of
the Verifier, we consider the verification speed as the maxi-
mum number of online measurements verified per second. To
measure this metrics, we perform the following experiment
for each SPEC tool: first, we use the Prover to generate and
save the online measurements of a SPEC tool; then, the Ver-
ifier verifies all of them without involving any element that
might introduce delay (e.g., network). In addition, we also
introduce a digital fingerprint based on AES [38] to simulate
an ideal scenario in which the Prover is fast. We perform
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Figure 9: Average number of procedure calls and procedure
returns found during the Online Program Analysis of the
SPEC CPU 2017 tools.
the verification by loading the offline measurements in an in-
memory hash map and performing the shadow stack. Finally,
we compute the average verification speed of all tools.
According to our experiments, the average verification
speed is 2M of online measurements per second, with a range
that goes from 1.4M to 2.7M of online measurements per
second. This result outperforms previous works in which the
authors reported a verification speed that goes from 110 [21]
to 30K [9] of control-flow events per second. As for the attes-
tation speed, we recall that each online measurement contains
at least one control-flow event.
The performance of the shadow stack depends on the num-
ber of procedure calls and procedure returns found during the
generation of online measurements in the Online Program
Analysis phase. To estimate the impact on the shadow stack,
we run each experiment of the SPEC CPU 2017 tool and
count the number of procedure calls and procedure returns.
Figure 9 shows the average number of the above-mentioned
variables found for each experiment. For some experiments
(i.e., 505.mcf and 544.nab), the average number is almost one
since they include some recursive algorithms that correspond
to small LoAs. If the average length of the LoAs tends to one,
ScaRR behaves similarly to other remote RA solutions that
are based on cumulative hashes [8,9]. Overall, Figure 9 shows
that a median of push/pop operations is less than 4, which
implies a fast update. Combining an in-memory hash map and
a shadow stack allows ScaRR to perform a fast verification
phase.
7.3 Network Impact and Mitigation
A high sending rate of partial reports from the Prover might
generate a network congestion and therefore affect the ver-
ification phase. To reduce network congestion and improve
verification speed, we perform an empirical measurement of
the amount of data (i.e., MB) sent on a local network with
respect to the verification speed by applying different settings.
The experiment setup is similar to Section 7.2, but the Prover
and the Verifier are connected through an Ethernet network
with a bandwidth of 10Mbit/s. At first, we record 1M of online
measurements for each SPEC CPU 2017 tool. Then, we send
the partial reports to the Verifier over a TCP connection, each
time adopting a different approach among the following ones:
Single, Batch, Zip [7], Lzma [31], Bz2 [1] and ZStandard [6].
The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 10. In
the first two modes (i.e., Single and Batch), we send a single
online measurement and 50K online measurements in each
partial report, respectively. As shown in the graph, both ap-
proaches generate a high amount of network traffic (around
80MB), introducing a network delay which slows down the
verification speed. For the other four approaches, each par-
tial report still contains 50K online measurements, but it is
generated through different compression algorithms. All the
four algorithms provide a high compression rate (on average
over 95%) with a consequent reduction in the network over-
load. However, the algorithms have also different compression
and decompression delays, which affect the verification speed.
The Zip and ZStandard show the best performances with 1.2M
of online measurements/s and 1.6M of online measurements/s,
respectively, while Bz2 (30K of online measurements/s) and
Lzma (0.4M of online measurements/s) are the worst ones.
The number of online measurements per partial report might
introduce a delay in detecting attacks and its value depends
on the monitored application. We opted for 50K because the
SPEC CPU tools generate a high number of online measure-
ments overall. However, this parameter strictly depends on the
monitored application. This experiment shows that we can use
compression algorithms to mitigate the network congestion
and keep a high verification speed.
7.4 Security & Privacy Considerations
Here, we describe the security and privacy guarantees intro-
duced by ScaRR.
Code Injection. In this scenario, an attacker loads mali-
cious code, e.g., Shellcode, into memory and executes it by ex-
ploiting a memory corruption error [37]. A typical approach is
to inject code into a buffer which is under the attacker control.
The adversary can, then, exploit vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer
overflows) to hijack the program control-flow towards the
shellcode (e.g., by corrupting a function return address).
When a W⊕X protection is in place, this attempt will gen-
erate a memory protection error, since the injected code is
placed in a writable memory area and it is not executable.
In case there is no W⊕X enabled, the attack will generate a
wrong LoA detected by the Verifier.
Another strategy might be to overwrite a node (i.e., a
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Figure 10: Comparison of different approaches for generat-
ing partial repors in terms of network traffic and verification
speed.
BBL) already present in memory. Even though this attempt
is mitigated by W⊕X, as executable memory regions are not
writable, it is still possible to perform the attack by chang-
ing the memory protection attributes through the operating
system interface (e.g., the mprotect system call in Linux),
which makes the memory area writable. The final result would
be an override of the application code. Thus, the static RA of
ScaRR can spot the attack.
Return-oriented Programming. Compared to previous
attacks, the code-reuse ones are more challenging since they
do not inject new nodes, but they simply reorder legitimate
BBLs. Among those, the most popular attack [36] is ROP [17],
which exploits small sequences of code (gadgets) that end
with a ret instruction. Those gadgets already exist in the
programs or libraries code, therefore, no code is injected. The
ROP attacks are Turing-complete in nontrivial programs [17],
and common defence mechanisms are still not strong enough
to definitely stop this threat.
To perform a ROP attack, an adversary has to link together
a set of gadgets through the so-called ROP chain, which is
a list of gadget addresses. A ROP chain is typically injected
through a stack overflow vulnerability, by writing the chain
so that the first gadget address overlaps a function return
address. Once the function returns, the ROP chain will be
triggered and will execute the gadget in sequence. Through
more advanced techniques such as stack pivoting [19], ROP
can also be applied to other classes of vulnerabilities, e.g.,
heap corruption. Intuitively, a ROP attack produces a lot of
new edges to concatenate all the gadgets, which means invalid
online measurements that will be detected by ScaRR at the
first checkpoint.
Jump-oriented Programming. An alternative to ROP at-
tacks are the JOP ones [16, 47], which exploit special gad-
gets based on indirect jump and call instructions. ScaRR
can detect those attacks since they deviate from the original
control-flow.
Function Reuse Attacks. Those attacks rely on a sequence
of subroutines, that are called in an unexpected order, e.g.,
through virtual functions calls in C++ objects. ScaRR can
detect these attacks, since the ScaRR control-flow model con-
siders both the calling and the target addresses for each pro-
cedure call. Thus, an unexpected invocation will result in
a wrong LoA. For instance, in Counterfeit Object-Oriented
Programming (COOP) attacks [35], an attacker uses a loop
to invoke a set of functions by overwriting a vtable and in-
voking functions from different calling addresses generates
unexpected LoAs.
8 Discussion
In this section we discuss limitations and possible solutions
for ScaRR.
Control-flow graph. Extracting a complete and correct
CFG through static analysis is challenging. While using
CRAB as abstract domain framework, we experienced some
problems to infer the correct forward destinations in case of
virtual functions. Thus, we will investigate new techniques to
mitigate this limitation.
Reducing context-switch overhead. ScaRR relies on a
continuous context-switch between user-space and kernel-
space. As a first attempt, we evaluated SGX as a trusted plat-
form, but we found out that the overhead was even higher
due to SGX clearing the Translation-Lookaside Buffer [39]
(TLB) at each enclave exit. This caused frequent page walks
after each enclave call. A similar problem was related to
the Page-Table Isolation [45] (PTI) mechanism in the Linux
kernel, which protects against the Meltdown vulnerability.
With PTI enabled, TLB is partially flushed at every context
switch, significantly increasing the overhead of syscalls. New
trusted platforms have been designed to overcome this prob-
lem, but, since they mainly address embedded software, they
are not suitable for our purpose. We also investigated tech-
nologies such as Intel PT [25] to trace control-flow events at
hardware level, but this would have bound ScaRR to a spe-
cific proprietary technology and we also found that previous
works [25, 26] experienced information loss.
Physical attacks. Physical attacks are aimed at diverting
normal control-flow such that the program is compromised,
but the computed measurements are still valid. Trusted com-
puting and RA usually provide protection against physical
attacks. In our work, we mainly focus on runtime exploita-
tion, considering that ScaRR is designed for a deployment
on virtual machines. Therefore, we assume to have an adver-
sary performing an attack from a remote location or from the
user-space and the hosts not being able to be physically com-
promised. As a future work, we will investigate new solutions
to prevent physical attacks.
Data-flow attestation. ScaRR is designed to perform run-
time RA over a program CFG. Pure data-oriented attacks
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might force the program to execute valid, but undesired paths
without injecting new edges. To improve our solution, we
will investigate possible strategies to mitigate this type of
attacks, considering the availability of recent tools able to
automatically run this kind of exploit [27].
Toward a full semantic RA. We will investigate new ap-
proaches to validate series of online measurements by using
runtime abstract interpretation [25, 26, 32].
9 Related Work
Runtime RA shares properties with classic CFI techniques.
Thus, we discuss current state-of-the-art of both research ar-
eas.
Remote Attestation. Existing RA schemes are based on a
cryptographic signature of a piece of software (e.g., software
modules, BIOS, operating system). Commercial solutions that
implement such mechanisms are already available: TPM [41],
SGX [18], and AMD TrustZone [46]. Academic approaches,
which focus on cloud systems, are proposed by Liangmin et
al. [44] and Haihe et al. [12]. More specifically, their solutions
involve a static attestation schema for infrastructures as a
service and JVM cloud computing, respectively. Even though
these technologies can provide high-security guarantees, they
focus on static properties (i.e., signatures of components) and
cannot offer any defence against runtime attacks.
To overcome design limitations of static RA, researchers
propose runtime RA. Kil et al. [29] analyze base pointers
of software components, such as stack and heap, and com-
pare them with the measurements acquired offline. Bailey et
al. [13] propose a coarse-grained level that attests the order
in which applications modules are executed. Davi et al. [20]
propose a runtime attestation based on policies, such as the
number of instructions executed between two consecutive
returns. Previous works suggest first to acquire a runtime
measurement of software properties, but do not provide a
fine-grained control-flow analysis.
A modern fine-grained control-flow RA is represented by
C-FLAT, which is proposed by Abera et al. [8]. This schema
measures the valid execution paths undertaken by embedded
systems and generates a hash, which length depends on the
number of control-flow events encountered at runtime. Then,
the hash is compared with a list of offline measurements. The
main differences between ScaRR and C-FLAT are the follow-
ing ones: (i) C-FLAT control-flow representation grows along
with software complexity, while ScaRR manages complex
control-flow paths by using partial reports, and (ii) ScaRR is
designed to use features of modern computer architectures
(e.g., multi-threading, bigger buffers). Dessouky et al. pro-
pose LO-FAT [22], which is a C-FLAT hardware implementa-
tion aimed at improving runtime performances for embedded
systems. However, LO-FAT inherits all of C-FLAT design
limitations in term of control-flow representation. Zeitouni
et al. designed ATRIUM [49], that strengthens runtime RA
schemes against physical attacks for embedded devices. Even
though the authors address different use cases, this solution
might be combined with ScaRR.
Dessouky et al. propose LiteHax [21], that deals with data-
only attacks. Their approach shares some similarities with
ScaRR: they send detailed control-flow events information to
a Verifier. However, they target data-oriented attacks (instead
of control-flow). Moreover, LiteHax uses symbolic execution
to validate the reports, which slows down the verification
phase. Abera et al. discuss DIAT [9], which is a scalable RA
for collaborative autonomous system. They model a runtime
control-flow as a multi-set. This allows DIAT to represent
complex control-flow graphs by using a relatively short hash.
However, its model loses information about the execution
order of the branches. This makes their approach prone to
attacks like COOP [35]. ScaRR, instead, combines a strong
static analysis and a shadow execution at the Verifier side
that provides a sound approach by design. Overall, our ex-
periments show that ScaRR can handle a higher number of
branches per second compared to all the state-of-the-art run-
time RA schemes.
Control-Flow Integrity. In the last few years, some au-
thors have proposed architectures that share some similarities
with RA [23, 26, 32]. These works are composed by two
concurrent processes: a target process (that might be under
attack), and a monitor process (that validate some target prop-
erty). However, ScaRR considers a different attacker model
since we consider a fully compromised user-space, i.e., an
attacker may tamper with the target software code or attack
the monitor process itself. Moreover, unlike ScaRR, these
solutions are not designed to provide any report about the
execution path of the target process.
10 Conclusion
In this work, we propose ScaRR, the first schema that en-
ables runtime RA for complex systems to detect control-flow
attacks generated in user-space. ScaRR relies on a novel
control-flow model that allows to: (i) apply runtime RA on
any software regardless of its complexity, (ii) have intermedi-
ate verification of the monitored program, and (iii) obtain a
more fine-grained report of an incoming attack.
We developed ScaRR and evaluated its performance against
the set of tools of the SPEC CPU 2017 suite. As a result,
ScaRR outperforms existing solutions for runtime RA on
complex systems in terms of attestation and verification speed,
while guaranteeing a limited network traffic.
Future works include: investigating techniques to extract
more precise CFG, facing compromised operating systems,
and studying new verification methods for partial reports.
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